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This study explores the influence of different social reference points and different
comparison group sizes on risky decision-making. Participants were presented with
a scenario describing an exam, and presented with the opportunity of making a risky
decision in the context of different information provided about the performance of their
peers. We found that behavior was influenced, not only by comparison with peers, but
also by the size of the comparison group. Specifically, the larger the reference group, the
more polarized the behavior it prompted. In situations describing social loss, participants
were led to make riskier decisions after comparing themselves against larger groups,
while in situations describing social gain, they become more risk averse. These results
indicate that decision making is influenced both by social comparison and the number
of people making up the social reference group.
Keywords: social reference points, risky decision making, peer group influence, social framing, social
comparison
INTRODUCTION
Since ancient times, people have been concerned not only about their own income but also about
the income of others. For example, in the Analects of Confucius, the renowned philosopher
observes “People do not worry about poverty, but rather about the uneven distribution of wealth.”
Employees usually care about their colleagues’ salaries, and they also pay attention to the results
of their friends’ investments. Intuitively, it seems that social comparison plays an important role
in allowing people to both learn about themselves and assess their social environment. Festinger’s
(1954) social comparison theory captures this phenomenon, proposing that people continuously
compare their own situation to that of their peers. The information gleaned from such comparisons
is relied upon to evaluate their ability and status.
In recent years, the importance of social comparison in human decision making and judgment
has come to the fore. Research has suggested that social comparison is an automatic process
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affecting cognition at the neurological level, with widespread
implications for behavior (Dehaene et al., 1998; Fliessbach et al.,
2007). Social comparison is frequently cited as an explanation
for the distortion of asset prices, for example, that involving the
2015 Chinese stock market crash. Buunk and Gibbons (2007)
have argued that strong focus should be placed on the cognitive
manifestations of social comparison, such as those involved in
decision making.
Social Reference Points (SRP)
Existing research in this area proposes that social comparison
can be defined in terms of a ‘social reference point (SRP),’
allowing it to be manipulated experimentally (Fox and Dayan,
2004; Haisley et al., 2008; Hill and Buss, 2010; Linde and
Sonnemans, 2012). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) first proposed
the concept of reference points in their prospect theory,
regarding it as a basis for decision making in the face of
uncertainty. Though a vast body of research has supported the
significance of reference points (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Rabin, 2000), most studies
have focused only on the decision makers themselves, and not
their social environment. Given that real world situations are
nearly always influenced by social factors, there may be some
aspects of decision making which prospect theory alone can not
accommodate.
For example, in the case where an individual investor is
facing a loss of 3000 yuan on the stock market, they can
choose either to sell immediately or continue to hold, the latter
being a risky option. According to prospect theory’s individual
reference point, decision makers are inclined to choose the
risky option, seeking to minimize their loss. However, if the
decision maker knows that a friend has lost 2000 yuan on
the same investment, they may change their risk attitudes
and exhibit risk-averse behavior. Thus, although treating the
individual as the reference point highlights the practical gains
and losses, it ignores the reality that decisions are usually
carried out in social environments where social comparisons
are likely to exert strong influence. The existence of SRPs has
received both theoretical and empirical support (e.g., Tversky
and Kahneman, 1991; Fox and Dayan, 2004; Hill and Buss,
2010; Linde and Sonnemans, 2012). Tversky and Kahneman
(1991, pp. 1046–1047) argue that “the reference state usually
corresponds to the decision maker’s current position, (but) it can
also be influenced by aspirations, expectations, norms, and social
comparisons.”
Previous studies examining the influence of SRPs on risky
decision making have tended to focus on the realm of monetary
decision making (stock investment, lottery, salary etc.; e.g., Fox
and Dayan, 2004; Linde and Sonnemans, 2012; Lu et al., 2015).
According to Xie and Lu (2014), these SRPs can be divided
into three types: social gain, social loss, and social neutral. In
general, people tend to view an upward comparison with others
as a social loss, while viewing a downward comparison as a
social gain. Different judgments and decisions are made based
on such gains and losses. Social loss can threaten self-concept
(e.g., Brickman and Bulman, 1977; Muller and Fayant, 2010;
Pettit and Lount, 2010), triggering a series of mental behaviors
with varied implications for decision making (Hill and Buss,
2010).
Social Group Size
Despite these results, some researchers continue to hold the
view that social comparison has little impact on risky decisions
(e.g., Rohde and Rohde, 2011). This discrepancy may be due
to differences in how decisions are presented to participants
in these studies, suggesting that many confounded factors
interact with each other during the process. Further efforts to
control and isolate such factors will thus be valuable to the
field.
One possible factor is the size of the peer group constituting
the SRP, one which previous studies have barely touched on.
The SRPs in existing studies are mostly constrained to one or
several significant others (for example, best friends, roommates,
colleagues, etc.), and rarely based on anonymous larger groups.
However, in collective societies in particular, people are likely
to adopt macroscopic social perspectives to acquire information
and modify behavior, bringing better-than-average effects and
worse-than-average effects to the fore (Moore and Small, 2007).
With large-scale social indexes becoming increasingly
accessible in the information era, this factor can be expected to
impose increasing influence on individuals’ judgments. When
students take standardized tests, for example, they can not
only compare their grades with their best friend, roommates
(a few people), classmates (dozens of people), but also evaluate
themselves against data based on the entire school and even
all of the people who have taken the test (tens of thousands of
people).
Existing studies support the idea that social group size
influences the results of social comparisons (Buckingham and
Alicke, 2002; Klein, 2003; Garcia et al., 2013). For example,
Klein (2003) introduced a comparison involving a single other
as well as a reported average from a group of others in a
feedback task. The results showed that, under the condition
of positive feedback, participants derived more information
when compared against an average of many others. In contrast,
they became more competitive and also more reluctant to pass
on useful clues when compared against a single other. From
a statistical point of view, comparisons involving larger SRP
groups may be more influential because they often represent a
larger and more stable data source, derived from a diversified,
representative group (Klein, 2003). One of the major aims
of the current study is to examine how the factor of SRP
group size affects social comparison results and risky decision
making.
Emotion and Framing Effects
Finally, rather than limiting the data collection to the decision-
making task itself, we also consider other variables that reflect
on the underlying mental processes. So-called rational decision
making is rarely limited to optimizing objective benefits. It is
a dynamic multifaceted process, often affected by subjective
feelings, something which is particularly pertinent in collective
societies such as China. For example, previous studies have
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shown that SRPs influence risky behavior by modulating self-
concept and emotion (Fox and Dayan, 2004; Förster et al.,
2008; Hill and Buss, 2010; Diener, 2012; Diener et al.,
2013).
Though a consensus has yet to emerge regarding the
psychological feelings involved in confronting losses and gains,
in general people feel positive emotion in the gain domain, and
negative emotion in the loss domain (Kahneman and Tversky,
1984; Ordóñez et al., 2000; Fox and Dayan, 2004). In social
contexts people tend to consider situations of social disadvantage
as the loss, and situations of social advantage as the gain (Fox
and Dayan, 2004). To enhance our data, we measured both the
social framing and the general feelings of participants during the
decision-making process.
Experiment
For the following study we recruited 312 college students as
participants, and chose the ecologically valid ‘examination’ as
the theme of the scenario, replacing the traditional monetary
theme. Within Chinese college society, test results are one of the
most important sources of social comparison among students,
who constantly compare their scores against others, and rely on
relative ranking to assess their achievement. Because of the strong
competition in the college system, exam grades play an important
role in students’ lives. Accordingly, test score is an appropriate
theme for presenting a risky decision.
In brief, the experiment involves a scenario where students’
exam performance is compared against either (a) a single student,
(b) the average of the class, or (c) the average of the school.
This comparison score is drawn from one of three reference
point levels: either a low SRP (social gain), a middle SRP (social
neutral), or a high SRP (social loss), denoted as L-SRP, M-SRP,
and H-SRP, respectively.
Students must then make a decision about whether they
would choose to answer an additional question, whose content
is unknown. Answering this question correctly would add
an additional 10 points, while answering it incorrectly would
lose 10 points. The only information participants are given
about this unknown question is that the percentage of correct
answers is around 50%, hence establishing a potentially risky
decision.
The experiment investigates the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: SRPs can significantly affect choices in risky
decision making. Specifically, participants presented with high
SRPs are more likely to be risk-seeking compared to those
given low SRPs.
Hypothesis 2: The impact of SRPs on risky decision making
differs depending on the size of the comparison group.
Specifically, the impact from the average of a large group will
be greater than that from a single other.
Hypothesis 3: The impact of different SRPs is also reflected by
emotional indicators. Specifically, the impact of high SRPs on
emotions during the decision making process will be greater
than that of low SRPs, and larger group sizes will also lead to a
larger effect.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Three hundred and twelve college students were recruited from
three equal-standing universities on the Chinese mainland using
the cluster sampling method; the group included both liberal-
arts and science students. The results from participants who
did not finish the experimental tasks were eliminated as invalid
samples. Ultimately, there were 274 valid participants, including
125 males and 149 females, and the average age was 20.78 years
(SD= 1.35 years).
Experimental Design
The study used a 3 (SRP level: H-SRP, M-SRP, L-SRP) × 3
(group size: single other, class, school) between-subjects design.
The independent variables were the SRP level and the group size.
The dependent variables included the percentage of participants
choosing the risky option, the risk-seeking index, framing, and
general feelings. Simultaneously, we collected data intended to
control for confounding variables. The specific measurements are
as follows:
Risky Choice
The participants made a final choice between the safe option and
the risky option. We recorded the percentage falling into each of
the two categories.
Risk-Seeking Index
Participants rated which option was more attractive on a 9-point
scale (1 = safe option, 9 = risky option). A response closer to 9
indicates that the risky option is more attractive, while a response
closer to 1 indicates that the safe option is more attractive. Thus,
a higher score indicates a stronger tendency to take risks.
Framing
Considering the scenario, participants were asked to define their
interpretation of the situation using a 9-point scale (1 = I define
it as a failure, 9= I define it as a success).
General Feelings
We used Fox and Dayan’s (2004) index for the measurement
of general feelings. This index consists of four items: sorrow-
joy, it’s wonderful-it’s a pity, contentment-discontentment, and
disappointment-satisfaction. A 7-point scale was used to measure
these items. A higher total average score indicates more positive
feelings.
Controlling of Confounding Variables
We measured three further variables, namely participants’ risk
propensity (“Generally speaking, do you tend to be risk averse
or risk-seeking in your usual state?”—1 = risk averse, 7 = risk-
seeking), the perceived importance of test scores to the student
(“Is the score recorded in your academic records important to
you?”—1= very unimportant, 9= very important), and students’
typical exam performance (“In your usual state, your test scores
generally tend to be above . . .”).
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The Experimental Materials
The experiment involved nine scenarios presented via a
questionnaire. In this questionnaire participants were instructed
to imagine that they were involved in an important test organized
by the college, and that the scores would be recorded in
their archives (for Chinese students, the archives will follow
them through future education and work stages, serving as a
primary reference representing their abilities; hence the archive
is extremely important for Chinese students).
The questionnaire presents as follows: participants are told
that they have achieved 80 points on the required questions,
and notified of an SRP achievement of 70, 80, or 90 points,
reflecting the L-SRP, M-SRP, and H-SRP conditions. They are
also informed whether the SRP reflects the score of a single
student, a class average score (30 people), or a school average
score (3000 people). Next, participants are presented with the
prospect of an additional optional question, which represents a
potentially risky decision. The content of this optional question is
unknown to participants, described only as having a 50% correct
rate. There are two options. The safe option is to submit the
paper and stop the test with a final result of 80 points; the risky
choice is to answer the additional question, with an objective
equal probability of receiving either 70 or 90 points (see Appendix
for full details).
Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a psychological laboratory.
All of the participants were volunteers. They were randomly
assigned to one of the nine conditions. During the experiment,
graduate students in the psychology department performed the
roles of experimental assistants and interviewers. The specific
process was as follows: the interviewers firstly presented the
relevant instructions and the confidentiality principle. The
participants were then allowed to read the materials in a quiet
environment and asked to imagine that they were participating in
an important test and making real choices. After the participants
had understood the scenario, they were asked to compare the
attractiveness of the two options and indicate their final choice,
as well as defining their framing of the situation and evaluating
their general feelings. Next, they completed the measurements of
the potential confounding variables. Finally, the participants were
thanked and debriefed.
RESULTS
The valid data of 274 participants were analyzed using SPSS 16.0.
All of the participants who indicated a risk-seeking index below 5
(the middle point in the 9-point scale) preferred the safe option,
whereas those who indicated a risk-seeking index above 5 tended
to prefer the risky choice.
Risky Choice
A Pearson Chi Square test revealed that SRP level affects the
percentage of participants choosing the risky option under the
condition of school comparison, χ2(2,88) = 12.261, p < 0.01.
As shown in Table 1, participants given the H-SRP (85.7%) and
M-SRP (71.4%) were more risk-seeking than those given the
L-SRP (43.8%),χ2(1,60)= 11.324, p< 0.01 andχ2(1,60)= 4.659,
p < 0.05. In the single other and class average conditions, there
were no significant differences between SRP level and risky
choice. Participants in the L-SRP/school comparison condition
were marginally more risk averse (43.8%) than those in the
L-SRP/class comparison condition (66.7%), χ2(1,68) = 3.609,
p= 0.057.
Risk-Seeking Index
Pearson’s correlation tests indicated that there was no significant
correlation between risk-seeking index and the control variables,
except for risk propensity and typical performance. We
conducted a covariance analysis by taking SRP and group
size as the independent variables, risk index as the dependent
variable, and risk propensity and typical performance as the
covariates. The results showed a significant effect of SRP
level, F(2,273) = 5.629, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.041: participants
in the H-SRP condition were more risk-seeking than those
given the M-SRP or L-SRP. Further analysis of the nine
different conditions found that in the case of school comparison
participants’ risk-seeking indexes were significantly different
between the H-SRP and L-SRP conditions, t(58) = −3.750,
p < 0.001. Meanwhile, there was a marginally significant
difference between the participants’ risk-seeking index in the
L-SRP/class comparison and the L-SRP/school comparison,
t(66)= 1.930, p= 0.058. Descriptive statistics of risky choice and
risk-seeking index in the experimental conditions are presented
in Table 1.
Figure 1 shows the average percentage of the participants
who chose the risky option across the nine conditions. The risky
choice was chosen more often in the H-SRP condition than in the
L-SRP and M-SRP conditions, a highly significant difference that
is particularly salient in the case of school comparisons.
As Figure 2 shows, in the L-SRP condition risk-seeking is
reversed as comparison group size grows, especially to the school
scale (3000 people), where it turns to risk aversion. However,
TABLE 1 | Percentage of participants taking risky choice and risk-seeking
index (Mean).
SRP N Risky-choice (%) Risk-seeking index
Single other
L-SRP 30 63.3 5.93
M-SRP 29 55.2 5.34
H-SRP 27 66.7 6.18
Class
L-SRP 36 66.7 6.28
M-SRP 31 61.3 5.13
H-SRP 33 78.8 6.69
School
L-SRP 32 43.8 5.25
M-SRP 28 71.4 6.07
H-SRP 28 85.7 6.96
L-SRP, low social reference point (70 points); M-SRP, middle social reference point
(80 points); H-SRP, high social reference point (90 points).
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FIGURE 1 | Average percentage of risky choice in the experimental conditions.
FIGURE 2 | Risk-seeking index in the experimental conditions.
in the H-SRP and M-SRP conditions, participants showed more
risk-seeking behaviors as group size increased.
Framing
In general, participants tended to frame their situation as
successful in the L-SRP condition, whereas they framed it as a
failure in the H-SRP condition; this was true for all three group
sizes. In the H-SRP condition the situation was more strongly
framed as a failure for class and school comparisons than for
comparisons involving a single other (see Table 2; Figure 3).
We conducted between-group ANOVAs by taking SRP level
and group size as the independent variables, and framing as the
dependent variable. This analysis yielded a main effect of group
size, F(2,273) = 5.568, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.040, along with a main
effect of SRP level, F(2,273) = 39.89, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.231.
Simultaneously, the interaction between SRP level and group
size was significant, F(4,273) = 3.65, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.052.
For further simple effect analysis (see Figure 3) we fixed the
SRP level and analyzed group size. In the H-SRP condition,
the scenario was more likely to be defined as a failure for
class comparisons and school comparisons than for comparisons
involving a single other. There was no significant difference
between school comparisons and class comparisons. In addition,
we also analyzed SRP level with group size fixed. We found that
for school comparisons, participants’ framing was significantly
different between L-SRP and M-SRP, L-SRP and H-SRP, and
M-SRP and H-SRP conditions. Specifically, participants framed
their situation as more successful in the L-SRP condition, whereas
more participants framed their situation as a failure in the H-SRP
condition.
General Feelings
We conducted several analyses of participants’ general feelings.
The results showed that, for all three types of comparisons
participants had more positive general feelings during the
TABLE 2 | Framing and General feelings (M ± SD).
SRP N Framing General feelings
Single other
L-SRP 30 6.07 ± 1.08 4.53 ± 0.68
M-SRP 29 5.69 ± 1.19 4.28 ± 0.73
H-SRP 27 5.18 ± 1.59 4.08 ± 1.04
Class (average)
L-SRP 36 6.47 ± 1.34 4.66 ± 1.06
M-SRP 31 4.87 ± 1.75 3.95 ± 1.28
H-SRP 33 4.12 ± 1.71 3.21 ± 0.99
School (average)
L-SRP 32 6.22 ± 1.24 4.76 ± 0.78
M-SRP 28 4.96 ± 1.77 3.96 ± 0.97
H-SRP 28 3.57 ± 1.28 3.17 ± 0.91
L-SRP, low social reference point (70 points); M-SRP, middle social reference point
(80 points); H-SRP, high social reference point (90 points).
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FIGURE 3 | Framing and General feelings in the experimental conditions. (A,C) We analyzed group size with SRP level fixed. (B,D) We analyzed SRP level
with group size fixed.
process of decision-making in the L-SRP condition. As might
be expected, participants had relatively worse general feelings in
the H-SRP condition. Moreover, participants had much worse
feelings for the larger comparisons, especially in the case of school
comparisons, than for comparisons involving a single other (see
Table 2; Figure 3).
We also conducted between-group ANOVAs by taking SRP
level and group size as the independent variables, and general
feelings as the dependent variable. The analysis of general feelings
yielded a main effect of group size, F(2,273) = 3.841, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.028, and a main effect of SRP level, F(2,273) = 31.837,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.194. Simultaneously, the interaction between
SRP level and group size was significant, F(4,273) = 2.888,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.042. For further simple effect analysis (see
Figure 3) we fixed the SRP level and analyzed group size. In the
H-SRP condition we found a significant difference between single
other and class comparisons, with participants’ general feelings
being worse for class comparisons. A significant difference also
existed between single other and school comparisons, with
general feelings being worse for school comparisons. There
was no significant difference between school comparisons and
class comparisons. We also fixed group size and analyzed SRP
level. Figure 3D, which graphs these results, reveals that, for
comparisons involving single others, the change in feelings is
relatively flat compared with larger group comparisons.
DISCUSSION
The results of the current study indicate that decision
makers’ risky choices are affected by different SRPs. Generally,
participants in the H-SRP condition were more risk-seeking
than those in other conditions, with no significant differences
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between the M-SRP and L-SRP conditions. This result is generally
consistent with our hypothesis that people take more risks when
faced with social loss (Haisley et al., 2008). In addition, we
observed that the impact of SRPs on risk-seeking behavior can
be significantly manipulated by the size of the comparison group.
In the case of single other and class comparisons, participants
generally tended to be risk-seeking under L-SRP, in line with the
findings of Lu et al. (2015). However, this risk-seeking inclination
dropped dramatically in the case of school comparisons, with
risky behavior reversed under L-SRP. This group was the most
risk-averse one, while H-SRP/school comparison was the most
risk-seeking one.
In summary, our results show that situations involving social
loss (e.g., L-SRP) have a strong, consistent impact on individuals’
risky decision making, as evidenced by increased risk-seeking,
while the effect of social gain (e.g., H-SRP) is more flexible,
varying with group size. Furthermore, comparisons which are
based on the average of large groups seem to impose greater
influence on risky decisions, leading to greater divergence
between conditions of social gain and social loss.
Our collection of data on framing and emotional response
allows the results to be explored from the perspective of self-
concept. Consistent with the findings of Fox and Dayan (2004),
social losses led to significantly worse self-concept and general
feelings than social gains. Although H-SRP (social loss) always
had a greater negative impact on general feelings and self-concept
than M-SRP and L-SRP (social neutral; social gain), increasing
the size of the comparison group served to amplify that effect.
Only in the social loss condition, where self-concept was
seriously threatened, did behavioral results evidence a consistent
risk-seeking tendency. This finding is consistent with the idea
that when an individual’s self-concept is threatened, they will
actively seek repairing measures to maintain their positive self-
concept. While both conservatism and risk-taking can serve
to support the maintenance of self-concept (Zhang, 2009), the
current study suggests that self-concept repairing measures tend
to favor risk-taking. It has been shown that a negative stimulus,
such as failure feedback, is more likely to attract attention (Rozin
and Royzman, 2001; Peng and Zhou, 2005; Dyck et al., 2009).
Individuals might thus be more easily influenced by negative
information when under a situation of social loss, causing
stronger negative feelings and the appearance of loss aversion
behaviors.
Whereas the idea of threatened self-concept can explain
attitudes for social loss, an alternative perspective is needed
for understanding attitudes involving social gain. We suggest
that these results can be understood in terms of opportunity-
threat perception. Research has shown that people’s perceptions
of opportunity and threat are different, and that such perceptions
can be easily manipulated (e.g., Highhouse and Yüce, 1996; Xie
and Wang, 2002). People view risky situations as an opportunity
when positive results are expected, adopting a positive attitude
toward the situation. In contrast, if negative results are more
likely, individuals adopt a negative perception toward the
situation and regard it as a threat. Different perceptions of risky
situations may lead people to demonstrate different behaviors.
For example, decision makers who are primarily concerned about
threats will choose risk-averse options, while those who are
attracted to opportunities will engage in risk-taking behaviors.
This subtle distinction between opportunity and threat seems
vulnerable to social influence, and could be easily biased
unconsciously in a social context where people take their cues
from the gains and losses of others. Fox and Dayan (2004)
argue that when people suffer from heavy losses and learn that
others also did, they are more likely to regard the situation
as threatening, and thus adopt a risk-averse attitude. It seems
possible that our participants adopted a similar outlook when
informed that many others had performed badly in the test,
leading to a negative perception of the risky situation. However,
our results also suggest that this effect is subtle enough that it is
only manifested for comparisons involving a larger peer group.
Given that the experiment was carried out in mainland China,
our results may also reflect cultural factors. Sedikides et al. (2003)
argue that in countries with a collectivist culture, where humility
is particularly emphasized (e.g., China, Japan), individuals are
less self-expressive, especially after achieving decisive success.
Yang and Gao (1991) suggest that Chinese self-evaluation is
more negative because of the emphasizing of “introspection,”
which drives people to engage in constant self-criticism. This
introspection leads people to subscribe the doctrine of the golden
mean: confident but not proud, modest but not inferior.
From this perspective we would expect Chinese students
to be risk-averse when obviously successful, while becoming
risk-seeking to counteract self-criticism and introspection when
failing tasks. A different pattern of results to the one in this study
might be found for individualist cultures, which emphasize the
pursuit of extreme individual success.
A final noteworthy point is that, similar to previous studies,
we also presented a social comparison involving a single other.
However, in our study, this set of conditions did not demonstrate
any strong effects. In sum, it seems that the effect on behavior
and feelings for such comparisons is much more marginal than
those based on the average of larger extended groups. As noted
by Loewenstein et al. (1989), in order for comparisons involving
single others to exert influence, some pre-existing interpersonal
relationships may be required, a factor which was absent from
our study.
Limitations and Future Directions
Though the study provides interesting results, several limitations
should be acknowledged, which set up directions for further
research.
First, with respect to the experimental materials, the strategy
we used and data sources we sampled are novel and have no
precedent in the literature. This limits the potential for our data
to be compared against other experiments. The issue, however,
can be resolved by future investigations.
Second, people may employ different cognitive evaluation
systems in different situations, such as those involving financial
matters, academic performance, health etc. Accordingly, the
experimental paradigm we used here should be applied to
different decision-making contexts, providing a more diversified
pool of results. The interaction between decision making and
framing/general feelings should also be studied in more detail,
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and in different situations, to provide feedback on the stability
and reliability of our results.
Finally, the greatest source of uncertainty concerning this
study is the question of how greatly the results have been
influenced by cultural background. Chinese culture combines
influences from collectivist society and ingrained Confucianism,
and plays a large role in organizing individuals’ thoughts
and behaviors within Chinese society. In light of this, it
would be valuable to conduct a counterpart experiment
involving participants drawn from an individualistic cultural
background. Heine et al. (2001) argue that individuals raised
in an individualistic culture are more competitive, especially
when they are close to the top. This contrasts markedly
with individuals from collectivist cultures, who are reluctant
to stand out. We can not know if the interesting reverse
in risk-seeking for the L-SRP/school comparison condition
stems from this reluctance, or whether it holds up across
cultures.
CONCLUSION
In this study we investigated the impact of SRPs from a
novel perspective, namely the size of the group making up
the reference point. As well as corroborating the finding
that individuals are more risk-seeking in situations involving
social loss, we have added to the converging evidence that
group size also plays an important role. Specifically, we
found that the larger the size of the comparison group,
the greater the shift toward risk-seeking for social loss
situations. In contrast, for situations involving social gain, the
larger the size of the group, the greater the shift toward
risk aversion. And the emotion generated in the decision
process also plays an important role that influenced the final
decision.
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